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DANIELA CARUSO
The Baby and the Bath Water: The American Critique of European Contract Law
61 American Journal of Comparative Law 479 (2013)
This paper aims to contribute to a larger research agenda concerning the
possibility of meaningful transatlantic dialogue about private-law reform. Both the
European Union and the United States regulate private autonomy extensively. In spite of
contextual similarities, however, there are several barriers making dialogue among legal
scholars difficult. In particular, the conversation about social justice—by now an
important element of private-law reform within the European Union—is less prominent
in American contract law scholarship. In U.S. legal academia, social justice is a matter
for moral philosophers, development economists, and constitutionalists, and also
provides normative frameworks for current property and torts debates, but its impact on
contracts scholarship has declined over the past few years, and efficiency discourse has
often replaced social justice parlance.
Against this background, this paper takes a close look at a recent transatlantic
exchange in matters of private-law reform—a Chicago Law School conference on a
proposed Common European Sales Law—and identifies a few counter-intuitive points of
convergence between U.S. and European scholarship. Along the way, the paper also
highlights structural and discursive incompatibilities, but concludes that the dialogue is,
as a whole, valuable and should be kept alive.
In designing post-national rules for private autonomy, Europe may draw better
lessons from U.S. regulatory experiences if it first deconstructs the wholesale pro-market
rhetoric of otherwise relevant literature. When this is done, the payoffs of American
commentaries become more appreciable. Taking the lead from some Chicagoan insights,
this paper recommends customizing the empirical investigation of EU markets so as to
factor socio-economic asymmetries into the equation of private-law reform.



Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
Paper presented at the Conference at the University of Amsterdam: The Architecture of Postnational
Rulemaking between Authority and Autonomy (Sept. 20-21, 2012). Thanks to James Fleming, Miles
Freeman, Martijn Hesselink, Duncan Kennedy, Chantal Mak, Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, and Fernanda Nicola
for comments on earlier versions of this draft. Errors remain mine.



I. INTRODUCTION
This paper aims to contribute to a larger research agenda concerning the
possibility of meaningful transatlantic dialogue about private-law reform.1 Both the
European Union and the United States currently exert considerable effort in regulating
private actor behavior. Ongoing reforms address contractual dealings between merchants
and buyers of goods or services (often individual consumers); and many of the new rules
are meant to be enforced through private litigation against the breaching party (usually a
merchant). Andrei Shleifer’s convenient taxonomy defines this enforcement of public
rules via private litigation as an intermediate regulatory step between untrammeled
autonomy and regulation via agency enforcement.2 The ideologically nuanced character
of this technique, half-way between top-down control and laissez-faire, makes it
politically more viable than stricter regulatory alternatives in response to the ongoing
global crisis. As a result, on both sides of the Atlantic we are witnessing new efforts to
redefine the rules of private autonomy in such markets as credit cards or online sales.
In spite of contextual similarities, however, there are barriers making dialogue
among legal scholars difficult. In particular, the conversation about social justice, which
in the European Union has grown into an important element of private-law reform,3 is
now less prominent in American contract law scholarship. In American legal academia,
social justice is now a matter for moral philosophers,4 development economists,5 and
constitutionalists,6 and also provides normative frameworks for current property and torts
debates, but its impact on contracts scholarship has significantly declined. To be sure, the
U.S. debate about contract rules is not exempt from worries about unfair commercial
practices and systemic distributive asymmetries,7 but the methodology for addressing
such phenomena has been, for a few years, more frequently informed by neoclassical

1

See Fernanda Nicola, Transatlanticisms: Constitutional Asymmetry and Selective Reception of U.S. Law
and Economics in the Formation of European Private Law, 16 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 87 (2008).
2
Andrei Shleifer, Understanding Regulation, 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 439, 445 (2005).
3
See Chantal Mak, Constitutional Aspects of a European Civil Code, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL
CODE 333, 349 (Hartkamp et al. eds., 4th ed. 2011) (“[T]he discussion on further harmonization of private
law can explicitly consider the role of private law in the redistribution of wealth in society. . . . [Private
law] represents a view on how society should be arranged and what values govern the relationships among
European citizens.”) (footnotes omitted).
4
See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1999); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971).
5
See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992).
6
See, e.g., Frank Michelman’s legal scholarship on social justice, as highlighted by Judge Guido Calabresi,
In Tribute: Frank I. Michelman, 125 HARV. L. REV. 879 (2012).
7
See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term, Standard Form
Employment Agreements, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 637 (2007).
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parameters and over-determined by efficiency concerns.8 In Europe, efficiency and
private autonomy also remain fundamental metrics among contracts scholars,9 but given
the political dynamics of legal integration over the past three decades, the proponents of
contract law harmonization have had to provide frequent reassurance that the
harmonization of market rules would not ignore the justice aspirations of Member States’
private laws. As a result, social justice has gained discursive ground in EU contract law.
Against this background, this paper takes a close look at a recent transatlantic
exchange in matters of private-law reform—a Chicago Law School conference on a
proposed Common European Sales Law (CESL)10—and identifies a few counter-intuitive
points of convergence between U.S. and European scholarship. Along the way, the paper
also highlights structural and discursive incompatibilities, but concludes that the dialogue
is, as a whole, valuable and should be kept alive.
In commenting on the proposed CESL, U.S. scholars offer a reflection of the
multitude of opinions that animate the current American debate on the regulation of
private autonomy. The challenge for European readers is to understand where each
critique comes from, to eliminate argumentative postures determined by contingent
American politics, and to adapt what remains to the different reality of European law and
politics. Reading between the lines is often necessary. There may be more support in U.S.
legal academia for an ethical, embedded and socially sensitive market regime than first
meets the eye. There may be important caveats and lessons underneath a patina of
neoliberal rhetoric.
The proposed CESL is meant to be an optional instrument, i.e., a sales regime that
parties may choose by agreement instead of default rules resulting from state law and
international private law. Some of the American commentary questions the wisdom of
adding yet another regime to those already available.11 Other contributions focus instead,
in whole or in part, on the substantive aspects of the CESL, namely on the particular
8

See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. (2003).
9
See, e.g., Simon J Whittaker, The Optional Instrument of European Contract Law and Freedom of
Contract, 7 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 371 (2011).
10
Conference on European Contract Law at the University of Chicago Law School: A Law-and-Economics
Perspective (Apr. 27-28, 2012), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/events/europeancontractlaw
[hereinafter the Chicago Conference]. The conference papers have been revised and published. See Thomas
Ackermann, Introductory Note, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. Special Issue 1 (2013).
11
See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Harmonization, Preferences, and the Calculus of Consent in Commercial and
Other Law, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. Special Issue 243 (2013); Eric Posner, The Questionable Basis of
the Common European Sales Law: The Role of an Optional Instrument in Jurisdictional Competition, 50
COMMON MKT. L. REV. Special Issue 261, 270-271 (2013) (noting that the pro-consumer rules of the CESL
make it unattractive to sellers and therefore unlikely to succeed as an opt-in device).

balance that the proposed text strikes between the parties’ private autonomy and
competing regulatory goals. This paper examines only the latter, substantive set of
critiques, in light of the fact that the optional CESL regime may one day serve as
blueprint for a supranational law of contract.12 Its content—in so far as it endorses a
particular blend of autonomy and regulation—may therefore matter more than its current
institutional status.
Most of the contributions referenced within this paper are critical of the proposed
CESL. Predictably, American scholars conclude that the proposal interferes excessively
with private autonomy; that its analytics of consumer protection are obsolete; that it leads
to inefficient results; and that it does not even promote fairness. This condemnation of the
Commission’s work, however, comes in several strands that this paper attempts to
disentangle. First, there is a typically neoclassical critique, which begins with the tenets
of price theory and ends with a negative assessment of the Commission’s entire
involvement in contract law matters. Professor Richard Epstein’s paper offers the most
prominent example of such a perspective.13 This approach still sets the tone of the
discussion on contract rules in U.S. academic circles and deserves assessment.
There is, second, a line of attack grounded in UCC studies that probes the
Commission’s understanding of norm formation in business communities. Professor Lisa
Bernstein, an authority in this field, manages to touch, perhaps inadvertently, on a highly
sensitive point of disagreement among EU academics—namely, the questionable wisdom
of assuming the existence of a collective and coherent ethos at the heart of the internal
market project.14
A third type of critique shares Bernstein’s skepticism and follows the
methodology of behavioral law and economics. It is notable, in this regard, that the
proposed CESL is disliked not only by law-and-economics scholars traditionally averse
to market regulation, but also by academics who have actively promoted regulatory
agendas in response to the recent financial crisis. The contribution co-authored by

12

See Thomas Ackermann, Public Supply of Optional Standardized Consumer Contracts: A Rationale for
the Common European Sales Law? 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. Special Issue 11, 12 (2013) (reminding his
audience that the CESL, just like many other instruments of private law approximation, has its origin in a
well documented project of substantive contract law codification at the supranational level. Because of
political resistance, this project has had to morph into diluted and pluralistic forms of harmonization, but
intermediate steps such as the CESL still bring the European Union a little closer to a uniform and
supranational contract law).
13
Richard Epstein, Harmonization, Heterogeneity and Regulation: CESL, The Lost Opportunity for
Constructive Harmonization, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. Special Issue 207 (2013).
14
Lisa Bernstein, An (Un)Common Frame of Reference: An American Perspective on the Jurisprudence of
the CESL, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. Special Issue 169 (2013).
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Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Oren Bar-Gill proves very instructive in this regard and
will be discussed extensively.15
To explain these authors’ negative tone, which is so loud at times as to silence
what is in fact constructive criticism, these pages address the narrow and defensive stance
of those behavioral economists who happen to support regulatory agendas in the context
of American legal reforms. Their caution is a necessary adaptation to a currently
dominant mode of American legal and economic thought that assumes the inherent
efficiency of markets and holds pro-consumer rules to prohibitively high justificatory
standards. This mode of discourse, however, is neither immanent nor universal. Evidence
of its historical contingency in American contracts scholarship should allow us to relax
its assumptions and to witness more fruitful dialogue between U.S. behavioral
scholarship and EU private-law projects. In designing a post-national architecture of
autonomy—its scope, its limits, its practical workings—Europe may draw better lessons
from U.S. regulatory experiences if it first deconstructs the wholesale pro-market rhetoric
of otherwise relevant literature. When this is done, the payoffs of American
commentaries become more appreciable.
The last part of this paper is about such payoffs. The emphasis of behavioral law
and economics on market-specific dynamics is a call for clarity about the uneven
distributive impact of a uniform, coherent and cross-sector EU private law. It is with this
type of insight that EU lawmakers and academics should engage.
The U.S.-based behavioral critique is, at its heart, an invitation to bring to the
table of private-law harmonization a whole set of currently missing data. Its emphasis on
consumer biases, irrational choices, and path dependence should prompt research on
aspects of the EU market that are to this day severely understudied. Research should
focus, in particular, on those market behaviors that reinforce the socio-economic
asymmetry between “center” and “periphery” in Europe.16 To name just one example, the
resilient dominance of Western brands’ reputation in the perception of Central and
Eastern European consumers is irrational, and yet strong enough to grant Western
manufacturers long-lasting advantages. Strangely, such phenomena are not on the radar
screen of the European Commission, whose current market studies yield mostly
15

Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulatory Techniques in Consumer Protection: A Critique of
European Consumer Contract Law, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. Special Issue 109 (2013) [hereinafter
Regulatory Techniques].
16
Damjan Kukovec, A Critique of the Rhetoric of Common Interest in the European Union Legal
Discourse (Harv. Law Sch. Inst. for Global Law & Pol’y., Working Paper, 2012), available at
http://www.harvardiglp.org/new-thinking-new-writing/a-critique-of-rhetoric/ (developing fundamental
analytics for the study of center-periphery asymmetries in EU law). See also R.L. King, Southern Europe:
Dependency or Development?, 67 GEOGRAPHY 221 (1982) (adapting the “core-periphery framework” to
the regional development of Europe).

aggregate data and fail to grasp the impact of proposed uniform rules upon structurally
disadvantaged merchants. Ultimately, this paper recommends customizing the empirical
investigation of EU markets so as to factor socio-economic asymmetries into the equation
of private-law reform.

II. THE CHICAGO CONFERENCE IN CONTEXT
As a general matter, U.S. scholars tend to take notice of Continental legal
developments when these developments play into a current obsession within American
jurisprudence. At the time of the federalist revolution wrought by the Rehnquist Court,
U.S. law reviews witnessed a flurry of writings on such topics as European legal
integration, subsidiarity, and multi-level governance.17 The EU’s ongoing project of legal
integration had immediate pay-offs for the scholars of U.S. federalism: it provided an
opportunity to discuss politically salient domestic affairs in a context that was foreign and
different enough to dilute ideological bias; it conferred a veneer of scholarly objectivity;
and it showed that enhancing or preserving states’ autonomy was not necessarily a
conservative project.18
The current surge of interest in EU sales law is equally due to an overlap between
positive EU law and a pressing reform agenda in the United States. The regulation of
private autonomy—its extent and indeed its very existence—is all the rage in
contemporary U.S. politics. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which
began operating in the summer of 2012 in the face of strenuous political opposition, was
allegedly the brainchild of two prominent law professors who had laid the theoretical
grounds for enhanced consumer credit regulation.19 In this context, the American
commentary on the proposed CESL is more than academic. Arguments matter. The
determined defense of freedom to and from contract was the cornerstone of judicial and
legislative assaults upon President Obama’s health care reform—a piece of legislation
17

See, e.g., George Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and
the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 332 (1994); Ernest Young, Preserving Member State Autonomy in
the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612 (2002).
18
Daniela Caruso, EU Law in U.S. Legal Academia, 20 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 175 (2011). Similarly
instrumental to self-reflections were the forays into Continental private law of the 1980s: the inquiry into
the efficiency of common law rules—an early spring-board for the phenomenal diffusion of law and
economics in U.S. legal academia—found experiential validation and intellectual legitimacy in the control
group of alternative legal systems. Another strand of U.S. scholarship, known as the corporate governance
movement, found both food for thought and important quantitative evidence in diverse European regimes
of executive compensation, share-holders’ rights, and corporate social responsibility.
19
Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008); see also Jared
Elosta, Dynamic Federalism and Consumer Financial Protection: How the Dodd-Frank Act Changes the
Preemption Debate, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1273 (“Adopting the idea of Bar-Gill and Warren, Dodd-Frank
created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau[,] whose mission is to ensure ‘that markets for consumer
financial products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive.’”) (internal citations omitted).
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whose enactment, in whole or in part, brings about massive reallocations of private and
public money. Since 2008—the conventional onset of the U.S. (and global) financial
crisis—American legal and political reflections have been dominated by one overarching
set of questions: why, how, and to what extent to regulate private autonomy.
The proverbial American faith in untrammeled individual initiative has indeed
been shaken by the economic downturn. It is by now established that under- and deregulation allowed for an unprecedented degree of disconnect between financial markets
and more tangible assets of the global economy; it is also commonly accepted that the
liberalization of mortgage policies led to the bursting of the housing bubble.20 But beyond
this basic core of agreement, opinions diverge widely about how to prevent this series of
unfortunate events from re-occurring. In the sphere of politics, as always, matters play
out rather simplistically: conservatives cling to different varieties of laissez-faire ideology
and point to the Euro-Crisis as yet another example of regulatory failure; liberals, in turn,
invoke the need for tougher market rules and look at Europe’s parallel regulatory
initiatives for inspiration. In the arena of legal academia, by contrast, the game is nuanced
and subtle. It is in this arena that the EU Commission, by launching its “optional tool,”
unwittingly provided U.S. legal scholars with a fresh opportunity to test their analytical
models and to take them to a higher level of abstraction. The Chicago conference could
deal with the regulation of private autonomy in another continent, and therefore in a less
heated or consequential fashion.
Every regulatory project of the European Union is cause for concern in the United
States. The regulation of technical or safety standards may result in trade barriers for
American products; privacy rules impose constraints upon commercial practices of U.S.
exporters; services regulation, especially in the financial sector, may foreclose highly
profitable avenues for U.S.-based banking, insurance and investment. Most importantly,
the adoption of strict regulatory models by the European Union—a major trade bloc—is
so prominent on the world scene as to raise questions about alternative, and often more
relaxed, arrangements on the other side of the Atlantic.21 Consumer protection—an
incidental goal of the CESL22—is one aspect of regulation that is subject to close
monitoring in the United States. This field of EU action was notably shaped by American

20

See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, Reversal of Fortune, 50 VANITY FAIR 134 (2008); Joseph Stiglitz, The Book of
Jobs, 54 VANITY FAIR 34 (2012) (explaining the crisis, in large part, as a consequence of the nonregulation of financial and housing markets since the 1980s).
21
Francesca Bignami, Cooperative Legalism and the Non-Americanization of European Regulatory Styles:
The Case of Data Privacy, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 411 (2011).
22
See Simon Whittaker, Identifying Legal Costs of Operation of the Common European Sales Law, 50
COMMON MKT. L. REV. Special Issue 85 (2013) (emphasizing that the CESL’s primary goal is the
facilitation of cross-border trade).

archetypes at its dawn,23 but it soon developed its own structure and philosophy. When
EU lawmakers enact pro-consumer measures that diverge from those prevalent, at any
given time, on American soil, U.S. observers tend to remark upon the superiority of their
own (often less intrusive) regulatory mechanisms. When the EEC product liability
directive was adopted, for instance, the U.S. scholars who were arguing for the demise of
strict liability in the Restatement Third of Torts: Products Liability, took the trouble to
criticize the European choice as theoretically ill-conceived and indifferent to empirical
evidence.24
The CESL proposal has prompted similar reactions in U.S. legal academia. The
proposal imposes a number of limits upon private autonomy and explicitly protects
consumers from aggressive business practices. It is, therefore, a typical project of EU
regulation that embodies a higher degree of paternalism than its American counterpart.25
U.S. critics have predictably begun to take the proposal apart, this time with perhaps
particularly high energy and enthusiasm.26

III. THE NEO-CLASSICAL CRITIQUE OF THE CESL PROPOSAL
The question whether the harmonization of private law by means of EU
legislation should embrace the goal of social justice has been answered, by many
Europeans and some foreign observers, in the affirmative.27 In typical old-continent
fashion, this answer has been grounded in political, historical, and philosophical
arguments. In support of this choice, authors have invoked the expressive function of
23

See Michelle Everson, Legal Constructions of the Consumer, in KNOWING CONSUMERS: ACTORS,
IMAGES, IDENTITIES IN MODERN HISTORY (Gerhard Haupt & Frank Trentmann eds., 2005) (noticing how a
1962 speech by John F. Kennedy concerning the thalidomide crisis provided content for an EEC Council
Resolution on a “Preliminary Programme for a Consumer Protection and Information Policy” (Council
Resolution, 1975 O.J. (C 92) 1)).
24
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, What Europe, Japan, and Other Countries can Learn from
the American Restatement of Products Liability, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 12-13 (1999) (“The self-proclaimed
progression from negligence to strict liability in Europe and Japan is quintessentially 1960s American
rhetoric. The movement in this country over the last three decades has been in quite the opposite
direction.”) Similar criticism poured on the prohibition of many forms of distribution agreements under
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (now TFEU Art. 101) in the context of EU competition law.
25
With many qualifications, the closest American analogy to a uniform sales regime for Europe would be
the Uniform Commercial Code, which contains both mandatory rules and sticky default rules in favor of
buyers.
26
The Conference on European Contract Law was held at a top U.S. law school, and the CESL underwent
detailed commentary by highly esteemed contracts scholars. A tribute of this magnitude to the ongoing
work of European academics and bureaucrats probably means that the CESL has touched a nerve or two.
See Omri Ben-Shahar, Introduction: A Law and Economics Approach to European Contract Law, 50
COMMON MKT. L. REV. Special Issue 3 (2013).
27
Gert Brueggemeier et al., Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, Social Justice in
European Contract Law: A Manifesto, 10 EUR. L.J. 653 (2004).
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private-law codifications in continental history, the importance of regulating transactions
between private actors in a way that reflects higher commitments of the polity, etc.28 This
stance, while still vigorously contested, has gained sufficient ground in EU politics to
make it difficult for the Commission to enact private-law instruments that would
exclusively pursue the goal of market efficiency. More fundamentally, the Commission is
constrained by the historical fact that for at least one century the private laws of the
Member States have been embracing, to various degrees, redistributive considerations.29
The Commission’s slate is by no means blank. It simply lacks the power to reinstate a
neoclassical, discrete model of private law that is indifferent to such values as the
protection of the weaker party. Further constraints come from the important role of
consumer protection as a source of legitimacy for supranational intervention in privatelaw matters, and from the coarse assumption that, in business-to-consumer contracts,
consumers are weaker than traders. As a result, if the Commission wants to forge ahead
with its private-law agenda, it has to do so in a way that responds at least in part to social
justice considerations and that constrains private autonomy in consumer transactions.
Some U.S. commentators simply miss the point of such institutional limitations
when they assail the Commission’s proposal with neoclassical critiques.30 These authors
end up opposing just about any form of interference with private autonomy and
repeatedly point out that the costs due to traders’ increased liability will be passed along
to consumers in the form of higher prices. This stance is based not on the belief that the
market has no failures, but rather on the assumption that the market itself will, with time,
produce endogenous cures for its own pathologies—be they misinformation of
consumers, abuses of dominance, or insufficiently safe products.31 Traders will compete
for customers by improving both products and sales terms, until an optimal equilibrium is
established. Common law courts play an important role in this holistic scenario by
enforcing privately negotiated agreements as well as tort rules.32 By contrast, the
legislative preemption of private autonomy, with rare exceptions, interferes with the
market’s natural self-healing process and is therefore to be avoided like a toxic chemical
in organic gardens. Richard Epstein, denouncing the Commission’s “relentless statism”
and “bureaucratic ambitions,” expressed this line of thought in stark terms: “[S]o long as
the European Commission believes that freedom of contract is the preferred solution, it
28

See, e.g., HUGH COLLINS, THE EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE: THE WAY FORWARD (2008); Duncan Kennedy,
The Political Stakes in “Merely Technical” Issues of Contract Law, 1 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 7 (2001).
29
Hans-W. Micklitz, Introduction—Social Justice and Access Justice in Private Law, in THE MANY
CONCEPTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 1, 3 (Hans-W. Micklitz ed., 2011).
30
See Epstein, supra note 13.
31
Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
111, 111 (2006).
32
Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Richard Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).

should do what all sound regulators do to achieve that goal: step out of the limelight as
quickly as possible.” 33
Within this divisive framework, the chances of a fruitful U.S.-EU dialogue are
practically zero. The Commission is indeed committed to going forward with the
harmonization of private law and, as a rational institutional player, is definitely moved by
the self-serving goal of expanding the EU’s role in private-law matters.34 It is equally set
in stone that consumer protection is part of the Commission’s agenda and that, given the
legacy of Member States’ private laws, the sheer maximization of social welfare—with
no regard for its distribution among categories of contractual parties—cannot be the
guiding criterion for EU action. Along these lines, Professor Mak aptly rebutted Epstein’s
critique in Chicago by pointing at the legal-political context of the CESL (as opposed to
the merely economic U.S. perspective).35 Still, the gap between the two perspectives is
just too wide to fill.
More can be made, however, of the comments of scholars who take the general
approach of the CESL for granted, and only question whether the particular means
chosen by the drafters to produce social-justice inspired results really make sense.
Among these scholars is Lisa Bernstein.
In neoclassical style, Professor Bernstein’s work has explored the ability and
willingness of traders to self-regulate, without need to resort to state-provided rules or
courts. She has focused especially on communities of traders kept together by such
powerful links as religion, identity, and culture.36 Her findings, grounded in empirical
studies, yield a radical critique of Karl Llewellyn’s “incorporation strategy.” The
Uniform Commercial Code—Llewellyn’s brainchild—assumes the existence of
immanent business norms and adopts legal standards (such as “usage of trade”) designed
expressly to receive and enforce such norms. By Bernstein’s account, however, no
consistent usage really exists that is coterminous with any given trade as a whole; smaller
communities may at best harness weak norms from custom, but even these norms, while
perhaps initially helpful, are soon replaced by transaction-specific course of dealing.37
Hence, merchants resent having to submit to legal assessments that may be detached from
33

Epstein, supra note 13.
See NICOLAS JABKO, PLAYING THE MARKET: A POLITICAL STRATEGY FOR UNITING EUROPE, 1985-2005
(2006).
35
Chantal Mak, Unweaving the CESL: Legal-Economic Reason and institutional Imagination in European
Contract Law, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. Special Issue 277, 286-294 (2013).
36
Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
37
Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary
Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 76 (1999).
34
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their intended deals. To Bernstein, the CESL’s frequent recourse to social norm
incorporation is anathema. If the incorporation technique does not work even where all
the preconditions for the emergence of common trade ethics subsist, how could it
possibly function in a market as diverse and inchoate as the European Union?
Professor Bernstein’s work is well known to EU scholars of self-regulation in
European contract law.38 Self-regulation by professional bodies has proven successful in
certain areas of the European market and has been the Commission’s saving grace in
matters of harmonization of technical standards since 1985. But when the harmonization
of contract law is at stake, Bernstein’s stance may become anathema itself. General
clauses and incorporation techniques abound in existing civil codes and would be
essential to the passing of uniform laws because they would allow for judicial discretion
in national courts. Once again, it would be impossible, given the institutional boundaries
of private-law harmonization, to please all relevant constituencies without periodic
reference to local norms (in the CESL proposal variously named “good commercial
practice” or “good faith and fair dealing” or simply “usage”). In fact, such incorporation
clauses would be the lynchpin of institutional balance in a Europe with harmonized
contract laws, and as such, they have been vigorously endorsed in legal scholarship.39
Just as with Epstein’s contribution, the clash between U.S. scholarly critique and EU
institutional constraints leaves one with a sense of dialectical gridlock. This time,
however, the Chicagoan critique contains helpful hints for continuing dialogue. To be
treasured in Bernstein’s work is the call for a closer understanding of European markets.
As we shall see, the CESL and the entire project of private-law harmonization should not
ignore Chicago’s fundamental question—namely, whether common assumptions about
such diverse socio-economic realities as those at the center and at the periphery of the
Union are at all realistic. Bernstein frames the question as an empirical one, but the
answer, for better or worse, requires more than just empirical work.

IV. THE CESL AND BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
A central contribution to the Chicago conference came from Professors Bar-Gill
and Ben-Shahar.40 They share a basic faith in the tenets of classical law and economics—
most noticeably in the self-healing properties of most markets. Both have made important
contributions in the field of behavioral law and economics by collecting empirical data on
38
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40
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the relative rationality of market players and by testing the workability of theoretical
models. For these authors, the theoretical predictions of classical law and economics give
way to regulatory mechanisms only in cases of documented and persistent market
failures. The burden of proof rests on data collectors: laws should be shaped upon the
theoretical predictions of neoclassical economics unless and until evidence falsifies or
complicates such predictions.
Omri Ben-Shahar is the Chicago Law School faculty member who hosted the
conference devoted to the CESL. An important element of his rich scholarly agenda is the
project of busting the “myths of consumer protection.”41 His work has centered on
identifying market mechanisms that can bring about fairness in consumer transactions,
thereby rendering government regulation pointless.42 He has also authored a scathing
critique of traditional disclosure mandates, showing that they are useless (or worse,
harmful) as tools of consumer protection law.43 His critique of mandated disclosure as we
know it, however, is occasionally coupled with regulatory prescriptions. These include
the restriction of autonomy in consumer transactions whose intrinsic riskiness cannot be
cured by enhanced information.44
Oren Bar-Gill’s academic training and success in U.S. legal academia are in many
ways similar to his co-author’s. However, he has espoused the cause of governmental
regulation more visibly. Focusing on consumer credit, he has argued for the creation of a
federal agency that would oversee consumers’ access to financial products.45 To be sure,
Bar-Gill’s arguments in favor of regulation have always been drawn narrowly and
supported by quantitative and qualitative evidence in very specific contexts. His
passionate case for what is now the CFPB was utterly and avowedly post-empirical.
To scholars of this persuasion, the Commission’s work on the harmonization of
European contract law is bound to appear ill-conceived at its core. On one hand, it
contains long lists of mandatory rules, including a plethora of disclosure duties; on the
other, it bunches up into one large category a very diverse set of consumers, making it
impossible to justify any of its autonomy-thwarting provisions upon empirical and
41
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context-specific data. The authors do acknowledge the CESL’s peculiar legal nature—a
uniform law that would trump the variety of state laws only if chosen by the parties to
each transaction, and would coexist with both more and less intrusive sales laws in all the
Member States. Indeed, an important aspect of their objections is the foreseeably
awkward interplay between the CESL and background state laws. Most of their critique,
however, focuses on the CESL per se, as if it were a uniform law proposal of the UCC
type, subject to the opt-in of state legislators—not just individual market actors. There are
several key articulations in their argument.
The first and most predictable line of attack stems directly from price theory:
leaving sellers little wiggle room in the design of choice of forum, exculpatory clauses
and limitation of remedies will necessarily lead to price increases and hurt the very
consumers whom regulation intended to protect: “The ex post pro-consumer
arrangements will be priced ex ante. Consumers will thus pay for protections that many
of them would rather waive for a discount.”46
So far, the argument resembles a well-rehearsed line (the pass-along critique)
which also animates the paper by Richard Epstein discussed above. Epstein’s blanket
aversion to mandatory clauses and black lists is, however, rather extreme, and it is not
fully shared by these authors, one of whom, as we have seen, has been actively involved
in a major pro-consumer reform. In the Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar paper, the price increase
allegedly due to the CESL’s regulatory content comes under attack not so much on
efficiency grounds, but along distributive lines:
This price effect is particularly disturbing when it is regressive—namely,
when all consumers pay for what only the more sophisticated ones enjoy.
Ironically, when the price effect is regressive, a wholesale inclusion of
mandatory terms undermines rather than promotes, “social justice”
concerns, which intend to protect weaker consumers and secure their
access to the markets.47
The idea that mandatory clauses in consumer contracts would have perverse
redistributive effects, penalizing the neediest of consumers, has a long pedigree in U.S.
legal scholarship. It has often been applied in the context of habitability warranties in
landlord-tenant agreements, deemed regressive by “mainstream” scholars because they
make rentals too costly for the poor.48 Thanks to popular vignettes49 and to its alluring
46
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simplicity, the critique of mandatory warranties on distributive grounds has outlived
parallel accounts of economic reality.50 The critique is, in fact, so well established that
Ben-Shahar and Bar-Gill need only hint at it. Their intended rhetorical effect is irony: a
project heavily inspired by social justice may end up hurting the poor.
Their attack on the CESL then takes a methodological turn and targets what the
authors perceive as the major flaw of the proposal: “More fundamentally, we argue that
many of the mandatory arrangements lack an a-priori welfare-enhancing justification,
because they are not responding to a systematic market failure or to a systematic
redistributive problem.”51
Systematic market failures and systematic redistributive problems are the bread
and butter of behavioral law and economics.52 This strand of scholarship, now
spectacularly popular in legal academia, has at times thrown a monkey wrench into the
works of rational choice economics by subverting the normative results of price theory,
disrupting Chicagoan antitrust analysis, etc.53 In a comprehensive discussion of
behavioral law and economics famously penned by Professors Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler,
the example of mandatory contract rules is expressly invoked to show that the prediction
of traditional law and economics (namely, price increase and regressive distribution
flowing from the mandates) may be incorrect due to endowment effects or adverse
selection.54
Some commentators have viewed behavioral law and economics as an irritant,
especially when based on questionable data.55 Accordingly, Ben-Shahar and Bar-Gill
point the Commission in the only direction that in their view could justify its penchant for
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517 (1984) (defining this theory as “mainstream” in U.S. legal
academia).
49
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50
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market regulation via contract law: a precise finding of asymmetric information, resulting
from consumer biases and from seller conduct that caters to such biases.56 Professor BarGill has been particularly vocal on this point: “Only an in-depth inquiry into the specific
market can identify a behavioral market failure—a persistent consumer mistake that
causes substantial welfare loss. And only an in-depth market specific analysis can
determine the optimal regulatory response to the identified market failure.”57

Until recently, this move would have caught the Commission somewhat
unprepared. By design, the work of the Commission in the area of private-law
harmonization is one of rapprochement of different socio-legal realities—a quintessential
mélange, i.e., the opposite of contextualized empiricism. The European Union is a
gigantic and variegated market, which encompasses very different cultures of both trade
and consumption. Specificity is per se a challenge in this context. More fundamentally,
the relative dearth of empirical legal studies in the European Union as compared to the
United States is a function of a different methodological tradition.58 The historical
prevalence of doctrinal and theoretical approaches to law has regularly stemmed the
diffusion of legal realism and “law-and” movements.59 The American synergy of law and
political science, based on the understanding of courts as essentially political institutions,
has prompted interdisciplinary dialogue and popularized quantitative methods among
lawyers.60 This has not been the case in Europe, where law—mostly studied at
undergraduate level—has long remained insulated from other social sciences.
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Today empirical legal research is growing at a fast pace on European soil. In the
particular field of consumer protection, qualitative and quantitative data are now piling
up at impressive speed.61 But the particular burden of proof that Professors Ben-Shahar
and Bar-Gill place on the Commission’s shoulders still cannot be carried. The CESL is
simply an effort to create convergence between decades-old national regulatory regimes:
it does not invent any new pro-consumer device, and it cannot be held to retroactive
evidentiary standards. The existing national rules for consumer contracts, on which the
CESL project necessarily rests, may or may not have corrected pre-existing market
failures. If they brought about measurable improvements, they did so without proof,
because European consumer protection emerged from theory, ideology and inference,
rather than from statistical evidence of fraud or accidents. Reverse engineering is not an
option in social sciences, at least not in the context of multi-layered EU private-law
systems. It is no longer possible to study systematic, sector-specific samples of market
failures that may have been corrected, over time, by national legislation. The presence of
somewhat different regulatory models within Europe can at times offer a laboratory for
experiments, but the field of consumer protection has been, in many places, handled
through judicial discretion leading to myriad unreported judgments. The paucity of hard
data may be daunting.62 Where evidence is simply lacking, the burden of proof is difficult
if not impossible to bear. If the future of consumer-friendly contract rules at the EU level
depends on empirical findings of market irrationality, then the Commission should only
tread virgin soil and focus on new markets. For consumer transactions already regulated
by the states, EU harmonization—via optional instruments or any other tool—may be
doomed to idiocy in the eyes of many U.S. scholars. Theoretical and pragmatic
alternatives are possible, however, and should be explored.
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V. THE BURDEN OF PROOF: ORIGIN AND QUESTIONS
The now popular emphasis on context-specific empirical analysis stems, as
observed, from the success of behavioral law and economics in U.S. legal academia. The
relation between this discipline and neoclassical law and economics is unclear. Richard
Posner notably posited that, in most cases, rational choice theory would be capable of
incorporating any potential new insights of behavioral economics,63 as well as yielding
superior prescriptions. The founders and promulgators of the new discipline, by contrast,
have seen it as too big an improvement on neoclassical economics to be absorbed. These
postures have not been reconciled as yet. The disagreement has recently taken markedly
ideological tones.64
Professor Bar-Gill describes the relationship between the two disciplines is as follows:
Modern, neoclassical economics recognizes that even perfectly
competitive markets can fail. The standard market failures are attributed to
externalities and to asymmetric information. Behavioral economics adds a
third market failure. The behavioral market failure, with its emphasis on
misperception and bias, is a direct extension of the imperfect information
problem . . . . The behavioral economics model, even more than its
rational choice counterpart, is context dependent.65
Notice how this formulation sets up the two disciplines in hierarchical relation: both yield
theoretical models; the behavioral model, however, is less stable and needs the support of
empirical evidence. If context-specific data is lacking, the neoclassical model is by
assumption superior and carries normative implications.
A prominent application of this methodological stance is provided by Bar-Gill
himself in the context of what he names product-use information. Put very simply: with
products like credit cards and cell-phones, manufacturers and distributors know much
better than consumers how the product will be used or misused. By contrast, the
63
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individual consumer underestimates—say—the chances of defaulting on his credit card
deadlines, or exceeding the low-rate allowance of his cell-phone plan.66 Asymmetrical
information leads the consumer to choices that do not maximize his welfare. He does end
up defaulting and paying high late fees.67 He does use his cell-phone more often than he
thought he would. He has contracted inefficiently. In a rational choice world, the
predicament would be fixed along the following lines: the consumer would move on and
switch to those competitive credit card companies that advertise the true likelihood of
default and charge lower penalties, or to cell-phone brands that offer (higher) flat rates
and do not charge steeply for each extra minute. But here is where behavioral insight
makes a difference: the consumer is biased. The consumer would not be attracted by
lower penalties or flat fees, because he would continue to misapprehend his consumption
habits. Sellers would therefore have no incentive to tell him the truth about his
statistically likely behavior. They would continue to compete with one another on usual
grounds—low interest rates for credit cards; free-minute allowance on cell-phone plans;
etc. 68 This behavioral model makes the case for regulatory intervention, based as it is on
the finding that only regulation would cure the identified asymmetrical information.
The model is strong, theoretically compelling, and absolutely intuitive. The
behavioral scenario makes much more sense, at every level, than its rational-choice
counterpart. It can be beautifully formalized, yields guidelines for action, and is very
smart. Yet hard proof—not just plentiful anecdotal evidence of market failure—is
required for it to prevail, prescriptively, over a simpler and altogether myopic model of
the same market. This burden allocation has nothing to do with logic. There is ample
evidence of regulatory failure, but also ample evidence to the contrary.69 The
presumption against regulation stems, rather, from the particular intellectual and political
experience of law and economics in America.
Laura Kalman relates the blooming of law and economics, symbolized by the
publication of Richard Posner’s “Economic Analysis of Law,” to the 1970s’ “taxpayers”
revolt, the New Right and cultural conservatism.”70 The conservative grip on law and
66
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economics, however, was not immediate. The field was initially occupied71 and then
contested72 by scholars motivated by distributive justice as much as by the aggregate
efficiency of legal rules. The now dominant anti-regulation bias of neoclassical law and
economics used to be just one among several economic models of any given market.73 It
was shown, for instance, that habitability warranties—a significant interference in tenantlandlord relations—did not necessarily reduce the availability of affordable housing,
neither in theory74 nor in practice.75 It was also shown that the alleged conflict between
pro-consumer rules and efficiency was, in many cases, a false one.76 It is important to
isolate this strand of legal scholarship of U.S. academia, to understand its genealogy, and
to make it more visible in Europe, lest it be collapsed into the simple neoliberal, antiregulatory agendas. Contributions of this type stemmed from within neoclassical
reasoning and had none of the defensive tone of new behavioral inquiries. Only a radical
change in ideological climate can explain why, by the end of the 1990s, each challenge to
rational choice assumptions has instead been cast in the narrowest of terms, as if it were
the exception that proves the neoclassical rule. The reasons for this change exceed the
scope of this paper.77 Here it suffices to note that the current anti-regulatory bias in the
United States is a product of historical contingencies, and has no superior intellectual
pedigree than more “statist” conceptions of the common good.78
The effect generated by the defensive, exceptionalist case for regulatory
intervention is to burn otherwise viable bridges between EU law makers and U.S.-based
legal scholars. Take, for instance, Ben-Shahar and Bar-Gill’s condemning statement on
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mandatory disclosure: “[T]he conventional European disclosure paradigm [adopted by
the CESL] reproduces archaic templates that have consistently and irreparably failed.”79
This line loudly echoes Ben-Shahar’s capillary review of traditional disclosure
methods—especially disclosure to consumers via standardized forms, which has been
proven to go entirely unnoticed, to be unnecessarily costly, and even to be misleading.80
It would be easy, therefore, to conclude that disclosure is yet another unnecessary burden
imposed by the CESL upon traders, whose cost will eventually be passed along to
consumers in the form of higher prices. Indeed, in an ideal and now popular neoclassical
model, it is pointless to mandate disclosure, because an optimal amount of
communication between sellers and buyers as to product features will be achieved
through natural incentives and competitive forces among sellers, or (in the case of
dangerous products) by means of common-law negligence standards selectively enforced
in court. At first glance, the critique of the CESL’s disclosure duties seems to reiterate
this well-known refrain. A closer read, however, reveals other, more interesting
opportunities for intellectual exchange. Quickly, the authors suggest the possibility of
“new paradigm” disclosure duties: “-Very simple, aggregate metrics that consumers can
easily understand and compare, like total cost of ownership or satisfaction ratings. Information that is designed and aimed to facilitate the work of sophisticated
intermediaries.”81
This line hints at Bar-Gill’s convincing plea for imposing disclosure duties on
those categories of sellers who have hard data on consumers’ use patterns,82 or at BenShahar’s attempts to redefine the content of mandated disclosure in ways that really help
consumers gain meaningful information.83 As always, these suggestions are cast in
cautious and market-specific terms,84 but the clear—if brief—message is regulatory in
nature. If consumers are not well served by boilerplate warnings on sellers’ forms, it is
time to invent better ways for keeping them informed. This is a far cry from the
neoclassical approach to private law, which notoriously rejects the very idea of
redistribution through legal rules and deems the goal of aiding the disadvantaged better
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served, if necessary, through public law tools such as taxation.85 As observed above, the
neoclassical approach to private law generally tends to disfavor the reduction of private
autonomy. It continues to have an extraordinary grip both in the United States and in
Europe, tied as it is to neoliberal ideology.86 European contract law, however, hosts
alternative ideological trends that have recently gained scholarly ground, while in the
United States alternative voices are currently feeble. European academics traveling to
Chicago expect to find resistance to the very idea of redistribution through private law.
Against this background, the cautious pro-regulatory stance of these neoclassically
trained authors is especially remarkable and instructive. It is important to isolate their
principled endorsement of regulation through private law from their skeptical view of two
dimensions of the CESL: its thin empirical foundations and its ability to achieve
meaningful redistribution via an opt-in instrument.87
When this is done, it becomes clear that behavioral law and economics can
provide important support for regulatory projects inspired by social justice ideals. And in
an intellectual environment that places a lighter burden of proof on regulators, behavioral
insights may really carry the day.

VI. PRIVATE LAW, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND REDISTRIBUTION
A distributive justice question pervades, silently, the entire Bar-Gill and BenShahar paper. Are the pro-consumer rules contemplated by the CESL proposal truly
progressive? This is a question that traditional law and economics scholars tend to deem
only rhetorical and to answer, intuitively, in the negative. But through the lens of
behavioral economists, the question becomes real and has no predetermined answer:
given what is known of a specific market, who will really benefit or suffer from a
changed regime of private autonomy? Professor Bernstein’s skepticism about our
understanding of Europe’s myriad socio-economic realities contributes to the empiricists’
anxiety.
This quintessentially realist question has become crucial, among progressive EU
intellectuals, in the aftermath of a set of decisions by the Court of Justice of the EU, all
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concerning significant wage differentials among workers in old and new EU Member
States.88 In the especially iconic judgment known as Viking, the Court was faced with a
conflict between industrial action and market freedoms—in this case, the freedom of
Viking, a ferry operator based in Finland, to change its vessels’ flag from Finnish to
Estonian, so as to evade Finnish union control over its workers’ wages. Viking’s decision
to reflag had prompted collective action both within Finland and internationally, and
Viking, invoking its freedom of establishment, had requested that imminent strikes be
enjoined. The Court held that the right to strike could not be exercised disproportionately,
and that international collective action intended to impede Viking’s freedom to reflag
could not be justified under EU law.89 This decision acknowledged that low wages and
weak labor rights are a source of comparative advantage for new Member States’
businesses. The 2004-2007 enlargement of the Union would necessarily bring into
question the status of labor rights in Nordic and western Member States.
The case generated much anxiety in pro-labor circles. To be sure, nobody on the
left of the political spectrum would object to the idea of redistributing some wealth from
healthier economies to the periphery of the Union. What was—and continues to be—
upsetting is the fact that the particular redistribution enabled by decisions of the Viking
type moves wealth away from the workers of State A to the worse-off nationals of State
B, and at the same time allows the employers of State A to stay in profitable business. In
so far as, within State A, employers as a class are better off than workers, the type of
redistribution enabled by Viking is starkly regressive.90 Viking’s deregulatory effects,
seemingly virtuous on distributive grounds, fail the realist test in a multi-state context.
The pro-labor tone of this critique should not prevent us from noticing how
similar it is to questions raised in the United States by law and economics scholars in
matters of regulated private autonomy. Just like Viking’s endorsement of economic
freedom for businesses, the imposition of regulatory constraints upon sellers may seem
inspired by good intentions, but given the socio-economic asymmetry of present-day
Europe, it may actually steer wealth away from the wrong place. Imagine, for instance,
the following simple scenario: as a result of uniform sales rules, sellers in State B become
88
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subject to the same degree of costs as sellers in State A, but their ability to pass these
costs on to consumers is much lower: their brands—given consumer biases—are less
appealing; if they charged higher prices, consumers would not buy from them. Their
margin of profit is thereby reduced and would only be made up by increased sales
volume if consumers truly valued the increase in post-sale remedies caused by the new
law (an effect that cannot be taken for granted). In the end, consumers everywhere may
be better off, but the sellers who have contributed to consumers’ overall welfare are those
of State B only. In so far as they are, by definition, of lower economic status compared to
sellers in State A, the transfer of wealth that derives from sales law uniformity is of the
regressive type.91
To be sure, this type of inquiry has often been used for deregulatory purposes,92
but this should not lead us to discard its entire methodology. There are excellent
examples of distributive analysis informed by empirical findings and applied to
regulatory constraints upon private autonomy.93 The analysis may well yield proregulatory prescriptions or sound fine-tuning advice. When there is no predetermined
answer, it may be foolish to withhold the question. And the relative scarcity of empirical
studies in the European legal tradition is no reason to disregard the implications of
intuitive models.
Just as we duly question, in theory and in practice, the distributive effects of such
pro-market rulings as Viking, we should investigate the distributive impact of proconsumer rules. The plea for pragmatic impact assessment, which is central to the
American critique, should not be ignored in Europe either. Europe may not be able, at
present, to produce the sort of fine-grained empirical analysis that has come to be
required in behavioral economics circles. Nonetheless, Europe cannot and should not
continue to ignore, by design, the impact on the ground of its private-law
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harmonization.94 To be sure, even if the outcome of the inquiry reveals regressive effects
at any level, the result need not be (pace Richard Epstein) the “tamping down” of the
whole pro-consumer agenda.95 It may very well be that EU-wide contract rules should
continue to reflect uniform values such as the protection of weaker parties or the sanctity
of post-sale remedies. It would be important, however, to include in the architecture of
reform elements of compensation or reparation for those who stand to lose
disproportionately from an otherwise desirable regulatory intervention.
The template for such reparations is to be found in the rich economic and
philosophical foundations of systems theory, postcolonial studies and development
economics. Just like the harmonization of private-law rules, the stipulation of worldwide
labor and environmental standards may impose heavier burdens on developing countries.
It is important to be cognizant of such burdens in designing uniform rules, not because
standards should be eliminated, but rather because they should be embedded in
comprehensive and compensatory trade regimes.96

VII. CUSTOMIZING BEHAVIORAL INQUIRY
It is time to turn to the possibilities that behavioral law and economics—a
discipline in its infancy in Europe—could open up for European law and policy makers.
The very spirit of empiricism demands that we develop modes of exploration that the
U.S. camp of behavioral studies has not yet elaborated, and that may be particularly
suited for the project of regulating EU markets. It is also important to remember that
thick qualitative evidence may be, in certain pockets of Europe, the best that we can
assemble. As observed above, in an intellectual environment less prone to neoclassical
bias, a combination of credible theoretical models and detectable corroborating data
should suffice to rebut the presumption that markets can self-heal.
Predictably, behavioral economics has already gained official status within
SANCO, the Directorate General of the Commission responsible for health and consumer
protection. A link on its website takes visitors to a page that explains the methodology of
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behavioral economics.97 On the same page, there are links to market-specific studies,
such as online shopping for household appliances, energy, or meat, and data keep
coming.98
Unsurprisingly, in those data the Commission finds systematic proof that its
action is badly needed towards the goal of facilitating cross-border trade: a recent issue of
the Consumer Markets Scoreboard reveals, for instance, that e-commerce in the European
Union “remains largely domestic despite the clear potential in terms of choice and
savings across borders.”99
Notice, however, that the Commission’s findings generalize broadly. Buying
online domestically may indicate two very different things. In states where local brands
enjoy a high reputation, domestic on-line sales simply mean that consumers continue to
cling to such brands and to prefer them over cheaper imports. In states with poorer socioeconomic standing, whose local brands are insignificant and whose traders sell mostly
through physical channels of distribution, buying online within state borders may indicate
a preference for foreign brands, made locally available by foreign commercial
presence.100 All these circumstances—the superiority of western brands in the eyes of
European consumers, the relative ability or willingness to embrace on-line trade as
opposed to local shopping in different parts of the EU, the one-way move of Western
traders and brands to Eastern Europe, and the ability to segment markets thanks to
consumer biases101—are hardly visible, and so remain a vastly underestimated source of
additional economic imbalance.102
The result of this extensive blind spot in the Commission’s analysis of EU
markets is somewhat paradoxical. The making of uniform private-law rules for the entire
European market—seemingly a regulatory project—shares a basic assumption of laissez
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faire, namely an indifference to the socio-economic disparities of all market actors. One
can only hope that the progressive refinement of market analysis may bring to the fore
both intended and unintended consequences of private-law harmonization.
Some authors would question a priori the relevance of this style of investigation
to the making of EU private law. Europe, it has been argued, needs uniform rules that
embrace the value of consumer protection, care for the weaker parties, and are structured
so as to curb the abuses of large manufacturers against individual and isolated buyers. If
these are the stated rules of private interaction, the argument continues, these values will
“trickle up” and eventually lead to a socially sensitive vision of EU governance.103 The
code should set the tone for an overall decent European polity, even though the
uniformity of private-law rules across Europe may pose inconveniences of other type.
Besides—the argument often goes—the very embrace of economic jargon is tainted with
pro-efficiency bias. It frames political discussions in utilitarian terms and eventually falls
prey to neoliberal agendas.104 The revival of the work of Karl Polanyi in contemporary
EU private-law literature reveals this fear of contagion from exposure to economic
jargon.105 Whither markets? Wouldn’t the project of European integration rather benefit
from a suspension of market assumptions? The exception carved in primary EU law for
services of general economic interest is a most dramatic example of resistance to the
tyranny of commodification. The wave of political activism against the draft Bolkenstein
directive on cross-border services had the same flavor—a desire to turn the tables away
from neoliberalism and counteract the gravitational pull of economic logic.106
This chasm between “market talk” and social justice parlance is the result of a
historically contingent appropriation of economic discourse by a particular type of
intellectual and political worldview. Given this ideological quasi-monopoly, it is natural
for social justice advocates to experience alienation when exposed to the mantra of
markets’ principled efficiencies. It is, however, a scholarly and strategic mistake to take
the chasm at face value. The Chicago conference reveals the presence of a lively and
solid strand of law and economics inquiry that goes beyond neoclassical economics and
asks the very same questions Europe should ask itself. The proposed CESL, just as the
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entire project of EU law harmonization, is based either on legal theory or on qualitatively
poor evidence—large-scale data that really miss the point of market-based inequalities.
The socio-economic divergence between different pockets of Europe is dramatically
visible, yet the narrative that uniform market rules bring benefits to all remains mostly
uncontested in Brussels.
It is important to note, in closing, that these pages are not meant to resist the
continuing harmonization of market rules as a general matter. 107 Depending on political
circumstances or expressive aspirations, further steps towards uniformity may prove
desirable or unavoidable. What needs to change is the win-win narrative that
accompanies such projects within the Commission. When a uniform set of rules is
imposed upon a constellation of diverse constituencies, discrepancies may worsen rather
than be cured. If that is the case, then the costs of uniformity must be made explicit and
private-law reform re-embedded in corrective and compensatory mechanisms. It is
therefore crucial to subject proposed reforms to distributive scrutiny and to identify likely
losers before the game begins. Generic arguments in favor of consumers, with no insight
into east-west, north-south, or class dynamics, leave much to be desired in Chicago, and
should not be deemed sufficient in Brussels either. In forging ahead with its
harmonization project, Europe may be dodging numbers at its peril. Polanyi’s most
valuable insight in the present context is that dramatic wealth disparities have resulted
from precise planning and specific rules that seemed, in principle, benign.108 As the EU
project brings us to reconsider the rules of our markets, our focus must stay sharp on the
wealth they generate, destroy, or transfer.
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